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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on Michael Rego's appeal 
from a final judgment entered on April 10, 1998, in favor of 
ARC Water Treatment Company of Maryland, Inc. ("ARC- 
MD") on liability and on ARC-MD's appeal from an order 
entered on June 23, 1998, denying its petition for 
attorney's fees in this hostile working environment and 
constructive discharge case under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e et seq., and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
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SS 951 et seq. (West 1991). The district court had 
jurisdiction over Rego's Title VII claims under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1343(a)(4) and 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(3), and 
had supplemental jurisdiction over Rego's PHRA claims 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
The germane facts viewed in the light most favorable to 
Rego are as follows. On October 12, 1987, Rego began 
working at ARC Water Treatment Company ("ARC"), a 
predecessor to ARC-MD. At that time, ARC consisted of a 
Pennsylvania division with an office in Philadelphia, and a 
Maryland division with an office in Beltsville, Maryland. 
Joseph Cohen, the vice-president of ARC, essentially 
operated the Pennsylvania division, and Edwin Goldstein, 
the president of ARC, essentially operated the Maryland 
division. Goldstein, however, visited the Philadelphia office 
about once a week. 
 
Rego, a man of Italian descent, worked as a serviceman 
in ARC's Philadelphia office but ARC never employed him in 
the Beltsville office. From the beginning of Rego's 
employment, his immediate supervisor, Warren Brooks, 
used derogatory ethnic slurs toward him and wrote him 
demeaning notes. In the spring of 1988, after Rego 
complained about Brooks' conduct, a meeting was held 
among Rego, Brooks, Goldstein, and Cohen to discuss the 
situation. Nevertheless, even after the meeting Brooks 
continued using ethnic slurs and sending Rego demeaning 
notes. 
 
On June 28, 1991, or promptly thereafter, ARC was 
dissolved. On that date, pursuant to a comprehensive 
written agreement, its Pennsylvania assets and liabilities 
were transferred to a newly-formed corporation known as 
ARC Water Treatment Company of Pennsylvania ("ARC-PA") 
and its Maryland assets and liabilities were transferred to 
ARC-MD, a separate also newly-formed corporation. Cohen 
became the president of ARC-PA and Goldstein became the 
president of ARC-MD. Thus, the successor companies 
employed each of these executive officers at the location at 
which he had worked before ARC's dissolution. From June 
28, 1991, until he resigned on March 12, 1992, Rego 
worked for ARC-PA out of its office in Philadelphia. Rego 
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never worked out of ARC's Maryland office or for ARC-MD. 
Apparently neither ARC-MD nor ARC-PA prospered because 
both ultimately filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. 
 
On June 16, 1994, Rego filed his complaint under Title 
VII and the PHRA against ARC, ARC-PA, and ARC-MD, 
alleging damages from a hostile working environment and 
asserting that the defendants had constructively discharged 
him because of his national origin. Rego demanded a jury 
trial in his complaint. ARC-MD, however, requested a non- 
jury trial on Rego's PHRA claims, as well as on any Title VII 
claims based on actions that occurred prior to November 
21, 1991, the date Congress amended Title VII to provide 
for jury trials in certain cases. See 42 U.S.C. S 1981a(c)(1). 
The district court granted ARC-MD's request and thus the 
parties tried the case both to the jury and the court. 
 
At the close of Rego's case, ARC-MD moved for a 
judgment on partial findings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) or 
for a judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(a). ARC-MD argued that it could not be liable because 
(1) it never was Rego's employer, and (2) it was not a 
successor to ARC for purposes of liability to Rego. The 
district court granted ARC-MD's motion as it determined 
that ARC-MD had not employed Rego or discriminated 
against him, and that ARC-MD could not be liable under a 
successor liability theory. 
 
The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Rego 
against ARC and ARC-PA, and found that Rego suffered 
general damages of $25,000 for the period from October 12, 
1987 to June 28, 1991, although the court found that he 
suffered no damages during that period. The jury's other 
awards were for back pay, front pay, general damages from 
June 29, 1991, until November 21, 1991, and general 
damages from November 21, 1991, into the future. The 
district court thereafter entered judgment on the verdict 
against ARC and ARC-PA for $265,000 and, in the same 
order, the district court entered judgment in favor of ARC- 
MD. Rego appeals from the judgment in favor of ARC-MD, 
but neither ARC nor ARC-PA has appealed. Neither ARC 
nor ARC-PA has satisfied the judgment. 
 
After the court entered judgment in its favor, ARC-MD 
filed a motion for attorney's fees as a prevailing defendant 
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under the PHRA. The district court found that Rego did not 
act in bad faith in naming ARC-MD as a defendant, and 




The parties disagree as to the standard of review that we 
should employ in reviewing the district court's order 
granting judgment in favor of ARC-MD. Rego urges us to 
conduct a plenary review, but ARC-MD maintains that the 
order is reversible only if clearly erroneous. This dispute 
stems from Rego's assertion that the district court wrongly 
denied him a jury trial on his PHRA claims. He argues that 
if the court allowed him a jury trial it could have entered a 
judgment in favor of ARC-MD only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(a). On the other hand, if the district court properly held 
a non-jury trial on Rego's PHRA claims, judgment in favor 
of ARC-MD could have been entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(c). 
 
In cases in which a district court enters a judgment 
under Rule 52(c), the district court can resolve disputed 
factual questions. Thus, in a Rule 52(c) case, a court of 
appeals reviews a district court's findings of fact for clear 
error, see Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 
F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1998) (Rule 52(a) case), and its 
conclusions of law de novo, MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group 
Equip. Fin., Inc., 157 F.3d 956, 960 (2d Cir. 1998). On the 
other hand, if the district court enters judgment as a 
matter of law under Rule 50(a), a court of appeals' review 
is plenary. See Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
154 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1998). Rule 50(a) provides that 
a court may grant judgment as a matter of law in a jury 
trial at the close of the evidence if it determines that there 
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 
jury to find for a party on an issue. See Delli Santi v. CNA 
Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 1996). Consequently, a 
court of appeals must view the evidence on an appeal from 
a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party and must give the 
non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn in its favor. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). For reasons 
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that we set forth below, we are exercising plenary review of 
the judgment in favor of ARC-MD, the standard Rego urges 
that we adopt. 
 
We review the district court's denial of ARC-MD's motion 
for attorney's fees under the PHRA for an abuse of 
discretion. See EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 750 
(3d Cir. 1997) (reviewing attorney's fee award under Title 
VII); Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 752 (Pa. 1998) 
(reviewing attorney's fee award under the PHRA). Thus, we 
defer to the district court's decision not to award attorney's 
fees "unless it has erred legally, or the facts on which the 
determination rests are clearly erroneous." L.B. Foster Co., 
123 F.3d at 750. 
 
As we noted above, at the close of Rego's case, ARC-MD 
moved for a judgment under Rule 52(c) or for a directed 
verdict under Rule 50(a). The district court found that Rego 
"had not produced evidence to show that either (1) ARC-MD 
had employed [Rego] or engaged in any discriminatory 
conduct towards [him]; or (2) ARC was liable to [him] such 
that ARC-MD could be liable under a successor liability 
theory." Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of 
ARC-MD. 
 
While in view of the district court's determination with 
respect to the issues to be tried without a jury, it would 
have been logical for the court to have been ruling under 
Rule 52(c) with respect to Rego's PHRA claims and to his 
Title VII claims for the period prior to November 21, 1991, 
and Rule 50(a) for Title VII claims after that date, the court 
did not specify whether it was ruling under Rule 52(c) or 
Rule 50(a). Indeed, at one point the court indicated that 
ARC-MD was seeking summary judgment. In asserting that 
the district court had to have granted judgment, if at all, in 
favor of ARC-MD under Rule 50(a), and not Rule 52(c), Rego 
reasons that the district court denied him his Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial on his PHRA claims and 
that if there had been a jury trial the court could not have 
granted judgment in favor of ARC-MD under Rule 52(c) as 
that rule is applicable only in non-jury trials. Rather, Rule 
50(a) would have applied, and he contends that ARC-MD 
failed to meet the standard to obtain a judgment under that 
rule. Obviously, a court properly might enter a judgment for 
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a party under Rule 52(c) that could not be justified under 
Rule 50(a), as the court may resolve disputed factual 
questions under Rule 52(c) but not Rule 50(a). 
 
Rego is correct that Rule 50(a) applies in jury trials and 
Rule 52(c) applies in non-jury trials. Thus, it might be 
thought that we have to determine whether the district 
court correctly denied Rego's Seventh Amendment claim to 
a jury trial on his PHRA claim, so that we can decide 
whether to exercise a deferential standard of review. Yet, as 
we shall explain, we have no need to make that 
determination because we conclude that even at a jury trial 
ARC-MD would have been entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law under Rule 50(a). It therefore follows that 
even if the district court erred in denying Rego a jury trial 
on his PHRA claims, the error "is harmless [because a 
judgment as a matter of law] would have been warranted." 
Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. Keystone Heating & Air 
Conditioning, 934 F.2d 35, 40 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 
EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1225 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (stating that "denial of a trial by jury is reversible 
error unless a directed verdict would have been 
appropriate"). Accordingly, we will exercise plenary review. 
 
The district court based its judgment in favor of ARC-MD 
on two distinct grounds. First, the district court concluded 
that ARC-MD could not be liable because it never employed 
Rego. The factual predicate for this finding is unassailable 
as there is no contrary evidence. Indeed, Rego 
acknowledges the point when he states that he is a former 
employee of ARC and ARC-PA. The district court also found 
that ARC-MD could not be liable under a theory of 
successor liability, a conclusion that takes us to the pivotal 
issue on this appeal. 
 
In general, in the context of employment discrimination, 
the doctrine of successor liability applies where the assets 
of the defendant employer are transferred to another entity. 
See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 750 
(5th Cir. 1996). The doctrine allows an aggrieved employee 
to enforce against a successor employer a claim or 
judgment he could have enforced against the predecessor. 
See Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750 (7th Cir. 
1985) (successor liability under 42 U.S.C. S 1981). The 
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doctrine is derived from equitable principles, and fairness is 
the prime consideration in application of the doctrine. See 
Criswell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (successor liability under the ADEA). The policy 
underlying the doctrine is "to protect an employee when the 
ownership of his employer suddenly changes." Rojas, 87 
F.3d at 750. 
 
Ordinarily, however, absent a contractual obligation to do 
so, a successor corporation does not assume the liabilities 
of its predecessor. In this case, ARC-MD did assume certain 
of ARC's liabilities but its contractual assumption is not 
germane, as the assumption of liability was only to the 
Maryland operations and ARC employed Rego in 
Pennsylvania. Thus, we look to less specific controlling legal 
principles which recognize that the successor will be liable 
if it is a "mere continuation" of its predecessor. B.F. 
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(successor liability under CERCLA). It has been said that in 
an employment discrimination case, a court should 
consider three principal factors before making a successor 
liability determination: "(1) continuity in operations and 
work force of the successor and predecessor employers; (2) 
notice to the successor employer of its predecessor's legal 
obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide 
adequate relief directly." Criswell, 868 F.2d at 1094. 
 
Rego argues that ARC-MD is liable for ARC's and ARC- 
PA's acts both before and on or after June 28, 1991, the 
date that ARC-MD and ARC-PA took over ARC's assets and 
liabilities. But ARC-MD cannot be directly liable for any 
discriminatory conduct that occurred on or after that date, 
as Rego suffered his injuries at that time while in ARC-PA's 
employ. Furthermore, ARC-MD is not a successor to ARC- 
PA and thus cannot be liable in that capacity. Accordingly, 
ARC-MD could be liable for discriminatory conduct on or 
after June 28, 1991, only as a successor to ARC. 
 
Similarly, ARC-MD cannot be directly liable for any 
discriminatory conduct before June 28, 1991, as it did not 
exist until that time. However, inasmuch as ARC-MD is a 
successor to ARC, in some circumstances a court could 
impose successor liability on ARC-MD for injuries Rego 
suffered in ARC's employ prior to June 28, 1991. 
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Accordingly, we focus on whether ARC-MD can be liable as 
a successor to ARC for periods both before and after June 
28, 1991, as it is only in that capacity that it could be 
liable to Rego. 
 
This case does not involve the usual situation in which a 
predecessor employer transfers its assets to a single 
successor. In that circumstance, fairness may require that 
the successor be liable for its predecessor's discriminatory 
acts, for otherwise the injured employee may be left without 
a party against whom the employee may assert his claim. 
Here, however, the predecessor, ARC, was a single 
corporation with two separate divisions which became two 
separate entities one of which, ARC-PA, became Rego's 
employer and has been adjudged to be liable. Thus, even if 
ARC-MD is not liable as a successor, Rego has not been left 
without a legally responsible party, although Rego will not 
be able to obtain satisfaction of his judgment from ARC-PA. 
 
Moreover, as far as Rego's employment is concerned, 
ARC-MD is not a continuation of ARC. This point is 
important because a lack of continuity in the operations 
and work force of the predecessor and the successor weighs 
against imposing successor liability. Criswell, 868 F.2d at 
1094. We emphasize that prior to June 28, 1991, ARC was 
a single corporation with a Pennsylvania division in 
Philadelphia and a Maryland division in Beltsville, 
Maryland. After that date, ARC-PA took over the 
Pennsylvania operations and before and after that date ARC 
and then ARC-PA employed Rego in Pennsylvania. Thus, 
whatever might be true with respect to other claimants, an 
objective analysis demonstrates that as to Rego there is no 
continuity between ARC and ARC-MD. In this regard, we 
see no reason why successor liability must be imposed on 
an all-or-nothing basis with respect to a predecessor's 
creditors. 
 
It is important to recognize that there are other unusual 
circumstances in this case which militate against imposing 
successor liability on ARC-MD. After June 28, 1991, ARC- 
PA employed Rego until he resigned on March 12, 1992. 
Thus, for a period of more than eight months ARC-MD was 
powerless to take steps by altering Rego's working 
conditions to forestall this litigation. Rather, it was ARC's 
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other successor, ARC-PA, that could have taken these 
steps. Conceivably, remedial measures during that eight- 
month period might have been successful because however 
odious Rego's working conditions may have been prior to 
June 28, 1991, it was not until March 12, 1992, that he 
resigned and it was only thereafter that he initiated these 
proceedings. 
 
We acknowledge that a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that ARC-MD had notice of ARC's legal 
obligations to Rego, as Rego complained to Goldstein in the 
spring of 1988 about Brooks' conduct. But this factor 
standing alone would not be a basis to deny ARC-MD 
judgment as a matter of law, particularly inasmuch as Rego 
does not contend that prior to June 28, 1991, he hadfiled 
any administrative or judicial proceeding against ARC. 
Furthermore, there is no basis to conclude that ARC was 
divided into two corporations for the purpose of impeding 
Rego's ability to recover for any wrong done to him. 
 
Significantly, Rego seeks to hold ARC-MD liable on the 
entire judgment for $265,000 entered on the jury verdict 
even though, according to the jury, his damages were only 
$25,000 prior to June 28, 1991. Thus, Rego seeks to 
recover the bulk of his judgment from ARC-MD on a 
successor liability theory for damages he suffered after 
rather than before ARC-MD became a successor to ARC. 
Therefore, this case differs from the usual situation in 
which an employee seeks to impose liability on a successor 
for damages he suffered before the succession. While in 
some situations it might be appropriate to allow a recovery 
against a successor for damages assessed against a 
predecessor for a period following the succession, at the 
very least a court should pause before imposing such 
liability. 
 
Overall, based on the totality of the unusual 
circumstances, we are satisfied that as a matter of law 
ARC-MD cannot be liable to Rego, and that even at a jury 
trial ARC-MD would have been entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law on Rego's claims against it under Rule 50(a). 
In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that each 
successor liability "case must be determined on its own 
facts," Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750, and we have done 
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exactly that. Consequently, we need not consider whether 
the district court erred in denying Rego a jury trial under 
the PHRA as any error in doing so was harmless. 
 
We have considered ARC-MD's cross-appeal and find it to 
be without merit. Under the PHRA, a court may award a 
prevailing defendant attorney's fees and costs if the plaintiff 
brought the complaint in bad faith. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 962(c.3) (West Supp. 1999). We cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion in holding that that 
standard was not met. We will not fault Rego for not having 
made prior to this litigation the intricate substantive 




For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the orders of 
April 10, 1998, and June 23, 1998. The parties will bear 
their own costs on this appeal. 
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